Pharmaceutical M&A Activity: Effects on Prices, Innovation, and Competition by Richman, Barak D. et al.
13_RICHMAN (787-819).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2017 12:01 PM 
 
787 
Pharmaceutical M&A Activity: Effects on Prices, 
Innovation, and Competition 
Barak Richman, Will Mitchell, Elena Vidal, & Kevin Schulman* 
The rise of blockbuster pharmaceutical acquisitions has prompted 
fears that unprecedented market concentration will weaken competition.  
Two of the most prominent concerns focus on the upstream and 
downstream ends of the pharmaceutical industry: (1) the concern that 
these mergers will concentrate the market for discovery and will 
therefore lead to fewer discoveries; and (2) the concern that merging 
large marketing, sales, and distribution forces will strengthen the hands 
of select pharmaceutical manufacturers and weaken downstream 
competition.  Having considered potential dynamic effects in the industry 
and conducted a series of preliminary interviews with knowledgeable 
observers, though, this Article argues that neither of these common fears 
is systematically warranted.  There are, however, potential dangers in 
market concentration at an intermediate stage during the discovery-to-
development path: the stage for regulatory approval.  These preliminary 
findings are a product of dramatic changes that are currently reshaping 
the structure of the pharmaceutical industry.  This Article discusses how 
these structural changes contribute to the current merger wave, how 
dynamic responses by industry players in response to the merger wave 
mitigate the potential harm from competition, and how the political arena 
might still offer threats to market concentration. 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 788 
I.  BACKGROUND: TRENDS IN PHARMACEUTICAL MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS ....................................................................... 790 
II.  PHARMACEUTICAL ACQUISITIONS, PRICE EFFECTS, AND PRICING 
STRATEGIES .......................................................................... 794 
III.  M&A AND R&D—A CHANGING MARKET FOR DISCOVERY .. 798 
IV.  DOES M&A ACTIVITY DISRUPT RESEARCH AND PRODUCT 
 
* Professor of Law, Duke University Law School; Professor of Strategic Management, University 
of Toronto, Rotman School of Business; Assistant Professor of Management, Baruch 
College/CUNY, Zicklin School of Business; Professor of Medicine, Duke University Medical 
Center, respectively. 
13_RICHMAN (787-819).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2017  12:01 PM 
788 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  48 
INTRODUCTION? .................................................................... 807 
V.  UNTRADITIONAL SOURCES OF ANTICOMPETITIVE HARM: 
MARKETING AND REGULATORY BOTTLENECKS .................... 814 
A.  New Systems of Distribution ........................................ 814 
B.  The Remaining Bottleneck: FDA Approval ................. 817 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 818 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry’s contributions to global health and 
economic development make it one of the most important commercial 
sectors in the world.  Worldwide sales of pharmaceutical products 
reached about $1 trillion in 2015,1 and the value of the industry’s many 
lifesaving discoveries vastly exceeds that figure. 
At the same time, the sector is also highly controversial and has long 
raised concerns about pricing, marketing, and product development 
strategies.  The industry recently triggered renewed criticism when firms 
such as Turing, Horizon, and Valeant engineered dramatic price increases 
for generic products, and Gilead and Mylan made significant price 
demands for specialized drugs for Hepatitis C treatments and the EpiPen.2  
With a renewed sense that reducing pharmaceutical prices is central to 
making health care affordable, and with a renewed hope that vigorous 
antitrust enforcement might lead the way, these events reminded 
policymakers and antitrust practitioners of the importance of mergers and 
acquisitions (“M&A”) by pharmaceutical firms. 
Although M&A have been a staple in the pharmaceutical industry for 
over a century, recent mergers of industry giants—particularly over the 
past decade or so—mark an unprecedented level of consolidation.  Giants 
are now acquiring other giants, and concern has appropriately emerged 
for whether such acquisitions harm the competitive marketplace and 
 
1. QUINTILESIMS, TOP LINE MARKET DATA: TOP 20 GLOBAL PRODUCTS 2015, 1, 
https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/Corporate/News/Top-
Line%20Market%20Data/Top_20_Global_Products_2015.pdf (last visited May 16, 2017). 
2. Daniel Kozarich, Mylan’s EpiPen Pricing Crossed Ethical Boundaries, FORTUNE (Sept. 27, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/27/mylan-epipen-heather-bresch/; Robert Langreth, How 
Gilead Priced Its $20 Billion Blockbuster, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2015, 4:37 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-10/behind-the-1-000-pill-a-formula-for-
profits-inside-gilead; Johnathan D. Rockoff & Ed Silverman, Pharmaceutical Companies Buy 
Rivals’ Drugs, Then Jack Up the Prices, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2015, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/pharmaceutical-companies-buy-rivals-drugs-then-jack-up-the-prices-
1430096431; Valeant & Shkreli-led Turing Bought Drugs to Hike Prices, Documents Allege, CBC 
NEWS (Feb. 2, 2016, 2:39 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/drug-prices-shkreli-valeant-
turing-1.3430639 [hereinafter Valeant & Shkreli-led Turing]. 
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innovation pipelines. 
Fears that mergers will weaken competition raise two predominant 
concerns, each respectively focusing on the upstream and downstream 
ends of the pharmaceutical industry.  Upstream, the fear is that mergers 
of large research and development (“R&D”) operations might 
concentrate the market for discovery, reduce competition and 
experimentation for new discoveries, and therefore lead to fewer 
discoveries.  Downstream, the concern is that merging large marketing, 
sales, and distribution forces might strengthen the hands of select 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and weaken downstream competition, 
which could then reduce pricing pressures and increase distribution 
barriers to innovative new competitors.  These concerns prompted some 
policymakers and consumer activists to warn that merger activity in the 
pharmaceutical sector is reaching a tipping point that threatens increased 
prices, reduces incentives for innovation, and reveals other structural 
reckonings in the industry.3 
By contrast, other voices are less concerned about the mergers.  Rather 
than reduce innovativeness, mergers might generate more productive 
focus and greater economies of scale that actually promote development 
activities.  And rather than reduce competition and experimentation, 
mergers might open doors for innovative new entrants.  Thus, both policy 
and corporate strategy would benefit from a deeper understanding of 
when mergers will harm competition and when they might benefit the 
larger marketplace. 
This Article reviews theory and some evidence that articulates the 
likely consequences of M&A deals in the pharmaceutical industry.  It 
offers an exploratory analysis of industry trends and concludes that M&A 
activity appears to play only a limited role in current pricing 
controversies, although antitrust caution is relevant with some targeted 
deals.  The stakes for innovative activity, meanwhile, are higher, but this 
Article’s analysis suggests that merger activity is frequently associated 
with more active product pipelines and appears central to an ongoing 
innovation strategy in a dynamic global scientific and market 
environment.  In some conditions, though, M&A activity may create risks 
of dampening innovative capability, so that there is some potential for 
antitrust assessment of R&D productivity.  The implications from our 
findings suggest an industry where most acquisitions are a product of 
important technological and geopolitical changes, rather than a tool to 
 
3. Peter Young, Biotech Financial and M&A Trends—Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, 
PHARMEXEC.COM (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.pharmexec.com/biotech-financial-and-ma-trends-
two-steps-forward-one-step-back. 
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consolidate pricing or market power.  We do, however, find some 
potential dangers in market concentration at an intermediate stage during 
the discovery-to-development path: the stage for regulatory approval. 
This Article begins with an overview of the industry’s recent surge in 
M&A activity.  It then examines whether this M&A activity increased 
industry-wide concentration, increased prices, or reduced innovative 
output.  After exploring suggestive empirical evidence that industry 
M&A activity has led to neither industry-wide price increases nor a 
reduction in innovation, this Article explores two alternative and less 
traditional anticompetitive concerns from industry megamergers: 
industry concentration in marketing, sales and distribution of 
pharmaceuticals, and concentration in the regulatory process of seeking 
approval for new products.  Overall, the sector’s history and performance 
suggest nuanced implications for antitrust policy in the pharmaceutical 
sector, as policy ought to pay careful attention to certain regulatory and 
market structures as well as broad trends in a changing global industry. 
I.  BACKGROUND: TRENDS IN PHARMACEUTICAL MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS 
M&A deals in the pharmaceutical industry date back to the industry’s 
origins.  The four companies of Glaxo, Wellcome, Beecham, and 
SmithKline typify the industry’s development.  Each of the four 
companies began in the early 1800s, and grew by making between six 
and eleven significant acquisitions, as well as many dozens of smaller 
acquisitions, through the 1980s.  But as the industry approached the later 
part of the twentieth century, the trend of commonplace acquisitions was 
supplemented with what are commonly called “blockbuster mergers.”  In 
1989, SmithKline merged with Beecham in a $7.7 billion deal; in 1995, 
Glaxo merged with Wellcome in a $15 billion deal; and in 2000, Glaxo-
Wellcome merged with SmithKline-Beecham in a (then-unprecedented) 
$76 billion deal.4 
This history not only reveals that pharmaceutical acquisitions are as 
old as the industry, but it also reflects how M&A activity has steadily 
increased since the 1980s.  The blockbuster merger trend continued 
through 2008, which exhibited fifteen megadeals that each totaled over 
$1 billion, led by the Roche’s acquisition of Genentech for nearly $100 
billion, and reached historic highs in both numbers and values of deals in 
 
4. The mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) deal that created GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) in 2000 
was the latest in more than fifty substantial deals since 1859 involving predecessors of the company, 
including Glaxo, Welcome, Beckman, Beecham, and SmithKline. 
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recent years.5  Figure 1 illustrates the growth in pharmaceutical M&A 
activity and reveals that the number of annual deals grew from 
approximately one hundred deals in the late 1980s, to almost 800 deals 
in 2015.6  Industry-wide deal value reached almost $400 billion in 2015, 
for about 250 deals with reported value.7 
 
FIGURE 1: Global Trends in Announced Pharma M&A (Acquirer in 
Standard Industry Classification (“SIC”) 2834), 1986–2015.8 
 
A conventional wisdom developed to describe the recent emergence of 
megamergers.  To extract maximum value from blockbuster drugs, firms 
invest sunk costs in marketing and distribution.  When a firm’s 
blockbuster drug loses its patent protection, the firm needs to find other 
high-volume, high-margin drugs to supply its marketing mechanisms.  If 
it has no compounds within its development pipeline that can suitably 
utilize these mechanisms, the firm purchases another pharmaceutical 
company that owns patents for major compounds that can utilize its 
 
5. James Fontanella-Khan, Pharma M&A for 2016 Continues to Surge, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 1, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9adbce94-c902-11e5-be0b-b7ece4e953a0. 
6. See infra Figure 1 (depicting global M&A trends).  This calculation is based on data from 
Thomson Reuters’ Investment Banking Deal Activity.  SDC Platinum Database, THOMSON 
REUTERS, http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/data-analytics/market-data/sdc-
platinum-financial-securities.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
7. Recap Database, THOMSON REUTERS, http://recap.com/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
8. The source of Figure 1’s data is the Authors’ calculations based on the Thomson Reuters 
“SDC Platinum” database.  SDC Platinum Database, supra note 6. 
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regulatory and marketing capacities.  Thus, one explanation for the 
acquisition trend is that long-term investments in marketing and 
distribution trigger purchases for new discoveries.  When large 
pharmaceutical firms cannot fill their marketing channels, they acquire 
companies to maintain a steady supply. 
This interpretation of the acquisition spree, therefore, suggests that 
acquisitions constitute efforts to compensate for the lack of discovery by 
leading pharmaceutical companies.  To utilize sunk investments in 
marketing and distribution, large pharmaceutical companies must acquire 
other companies with profitable discoveries when these acquirers are not 
producing valuable discoveries themselves.  This is the conclusion 
reached by William Haseltine, who laments that the merger trend 
“reflects the failure of each company to discover and develop its own 
replacement pipeline.”9 
A related lament is that because pharmaceutical firms enter into M&A 
transactions because they fail to develop new compounds, they also 
merge to hide larger shortcomings.  Danzon et al. (2007) observe not only 
that mergers are a response to financial trouble, but that they are not a 
solution, either.10  They observe that financial hardship and patent 
expirations largely drive mergers, yet merged firms (after controlling for 
these troubles) experience slower profit growth than nonmerged firms.11  
Other anecdotal evidence confirms that the absorption costs of mergers 
are substantial enough to counteract many of the potential benefits of 
mergers.12  These findings suggest that mergers might result from 
executive agency costs rather than from efforts to increase shareholder 
value. 
Thus, the conventional wisdom interprets the current merger spree as 
a reflection of a faltering industry.  Firms that initiate mergers do so 
because they suffer from weak returns and exhibit inadequate innovation, 
and these mergers are then burdened by high integration costs and low 
profitability.  In this view, public policy, perhaps through merger review, 
should then intervene to discourage mergers of large pharmaceutical 
companies.  If, after all, mergers are products of agency costs and reduced 
firm value, then any proffered efficiencies defense that justifies additional 
 
9. William Haseltine, Why Big Pharma Mergers Magnify Failures, ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2009), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2009/03/why-big-pharma-mergers-magnify-
failures/16892/. 
10. Patricia M. Danzon et al., Mergers and Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and Biotech 
Industries 4–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10536, 2004). 
11. Id. at 29–33. 
12. A.T. KEARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY (Aug. 
2010), https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/256759/MA_in_Healthcare.pdf/6f7857c3-
80d5-4020-89fc-8ef86abb94bc. 
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market concentration should be rejected.  And, if mergers are evidence of 
shortcomings in pharmaceutical innovation, then perhaps policymakers 
should address this more foundational concern. 
But this conventional wisdom rests on two flawed assumptions.  First, 
it assumes implicitly or explicitly that the established firms should be the 
source of most major innovations; second, it assumes a static perspective 
on an industry that is undergoing significant structural change.  The drug-
development universe is a collection of heterogeneous firms and 
researchers, far more than what a few sets of large corporate labs could 
cover.  The industry has always relied on R&D and on firm heterogeneity 
to innovate, and a diversity of research strategies and skills is only 
increasing as biological and other drug forms assume growing 
significance to medical care.  Innovative outcomes are more likely to 
cover a wider space of activity and output if the industry structure 
includes a wide variety of players in multiple geographic locations.  
Consequently, rather than deliberating over how many established drug 
firms are necessary to generate optimal innovation, it might be more 
useful to understand the processes that maintain and generate industry 
heterogeneity. 
Thus, even if the industry’s largest firms are merging out of 
weaknesses, and even if these mergers fail to correct those weaknesses, 
these firms’ failings do not mean that the industry as a whole is faltering.  
Those fearing both the causes and consequences of concentration look to 
large pharmaceutical firms to be the industry’s profit leaders, primary 
sources of innovation, and principal avenues for marketing.  But reports 
from industry leaders and reviews of medical research suggest that the 
industry is moving away from traditional sources of innovation; that 
physicians writing prescriptions are relying on new sources of 
information; and that large pharmaceutical firms are carving out a 
narrower space in the market for drug development, leaving important 
innovative space for entrants and specialists. 
These changes color any evaluation of recent megamergers and 
suggest that their consequences—and the consequences of other changes 
in the industry’s landscape—are far less certain.  What is certain, 
however, is that the surge in acquisitions reflects a market that is both in 
transition and ripe for further study.  Among the most pressing questions 
are whether these mergers permitted the accumulation of market power 
that led to higher prices, and whether these mergers reduced innovation 
activity. 
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II.  PHARMACEUTICAL ACQUISITIONS, PRICE EFFECTS, AND PRICING 
STRATEGIES 
Pharmaceutical prices in the United States have unquestionably 
increased substantially in the past two to five years.13  How much the 
increases stem from M&A, though, is a question with a more ambiguous 
answer.  Well-publicized examples in which firms such as Turing, 
Horizon, and Valeant purchased companies with older products and then 
raised the prices of their products, often by many multiples, are highly 
visible.14  These companies also drew criticism from imposing high 
prices for specialized drugs, such as Gilead’s Hepatitis C treatments and 
Mylan’s EpiPen for allergic reactions.15  Yet established drug companies 
such as Pfizer and others have also steadily increased list prices during 
the past few years.16  It is beyond dispute that rising pharmaceutical 
prices pose fiscal dangers to both private and public budgets.17  It is not 
clear, however, whether the rising pharmaceutical prices stemmed from 
increased concentration in the industry. 
Figure 2 estimates industry concentration based on the Hirschman 
Herfindahl Index (“HHI”) for both the global and United States 
pharmaceutical markets.18  It appears that overall concentration in the 
 
13. Visualizing Health Policy: Recent Trends in Prescription Drug Costs, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(Apr. 5, 2016), http://kff.org/infographic/visualizing-health-policy-recent-trends-in-prescription-
drug-costs/. 
14. See Valeant & Shkreli-led Turing, supra note 2 (discussing both Valeant & Turing’s 
purchase of older drugs and raising the prices); see Rockoff & Silverman, supra note 2 (describing 
Valeant’s purchase of life-saving heart drugs, and increasing the prices by 525 percent and 212 
percent). 
15. See Kozarich, supra note 2 (noting EpiPen’s price increase from $100 in 2009 to $608 in 
2017); Langreth, supra note 2 (noting Gilead’s price increase to $1,000 per pill for a twelve-week 
treatment for Hepatitis C). 
16. Ed Silverman, Pfizer Just Raised Drug Prices by an Average of Nearly 9 Percent, STAT 
NEWS (June 9, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/06/09/pfizer-drug-prices-turing-
valeant/. 
17. Bradford R. Hirsch et al., The Impact of Specialty Pharmaceuticals as Drivers of Health 
Care Costs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1714, 1718 (2014); Ifrad Islam, Rising Cost of Drugs: Where Do We 
Go from Here?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 31, 2015), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/08/31/rising-cost-of-drugs-where-do-we-go-from-here (“The 
increase in drug costs—projected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Office of the 
Actuary to be 12.6 percent in 2014—has far outpaced inflation, which has hovered between zero 
and 2 percent over the last three years; it has also outstripped growth in other medical costs.  
Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), in its 2013 annual medical cost trend report, projected overall 
cost growth to be 6.5 percent in 2014 in the large employer market.  In stark contrast, a recent 
Express Scripts analysis declared a 13.1 percent increase in prescription drug spend in the same 
period.”). 
18. See infra Figure 2 (depicting the concentration in the pharmaceutical industry).  The 
Hirschman Herfindahl Index (“HHI”) is a commonly accepted measure of concentration designed 
to reflect the pricing power that market actors have.  It is calculated by summing the squares of the 
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industry is both low and relatively stable; the 500–700 range is well 
below the Department of Justice’s guidelines that consider HHI between 
1,500 and 2,500 points to be moderately concentrated.19  Figure 2 
demonstrates that recent price increases do not appear to correlate with 
market power based on greater overall concentration in the industry. 
 
FIGURE 2: Pharmaceutical Industry Concentration, Measured by 
HHI, 1998–2015.20 
 
Additionally, increases in list prices for drugs can be somewhat 
misleading because they represent actual market prices.  Insurance 
companies, hospital systems, pharmaceutical benefit managers 
(“PBMs”), and other payors with market power commonly negotiate deep 
discounts from list prices through a system of rebates and chargebacks.  
The health care industry has seen high levels of provider and payor 
consolidation in the last two decades due to inadequate antitrust 
enforcement.  This consolidation raised health care prices for consumers 
while simultaneously enhancing market power of providers and payors 
when demanding discounts from pharmaceutical manufacturers.21  While 
 
percentage market shares held by each firm in the market.  For example, an industry consisting of 
two firms with market shares of 70 percent and 30 percent has an HHI of 70²+30², or 5,800.  An 
industry with five firms, each with a 20 percent market share, is 20²+20²+20²+20²+20², or 2,000.  
It ranges from near-zero (for a perfectly competitive marketplace with many firms, each with very 
negligible market shares), to 10,000 for a monopoly. 
19. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: ANTITRUST DIVISION, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
20. The source of Figure 2’s data is from the Authors’ calculations, based on sales data from 
company annual reports (HHI is the sum of squared market shares). 
21. BARAK D. RICHMAN, CONCENTRATION IN HEALTH CARE MARKETS: CHRONIC PROBLEMS 
AND BETTER SOLUTIONS 13 (JUNE 2012), 
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these negotiations are typically confidential and nontransparent, there are 
suggestions that discounts can reach as high as 40–50 percent off the 
listed prices.22  Other customers, such as the United States Department of 
Veterans Affairs (“VA”) and Medicaid in the United States, also typically 
receive prices at a discount from list prices (the VA through direct 
negotiation and Medicaid through statutory rebates).23  Even with such 
discounts, overall drug spending is increasing in the United States and in 
many other countries.24 
Instead of prices correlating systematically with industry 
concentration, it seems that individual price increases are products of 
specific market structures and opportunities.  Specifically, recent price 
increases appear to have emerged from changes in firm strategies rather 
than arising from an increase in overall market power.  Some instances 
of price increases are consequences of firms exploiting opportunities to 
raise prices on generic drugs with few competing products.  More 
generally, many established proprietary drug companies are placing 
greater emphasis on specialty drugs, including drugs based on traditional 
small cell science and those stemming from the biological science 
revolution, that have few competitors in their targeted market segments.25  
While these strategies reflect the presence of market power (i.e., there are 
few competing products in the biofunctional space where these price 
increases take place), they appear uncorrelated with changes in industry-
wide concentration arising from M&A trends.  Instead, they reflect 
changes in market segmentation strategy, in which firms target medical 
needs where there are few competing products. 
This suggests that market power is better measured not in industry-
wide measures, but instead along functional equivalents, which is how 
antitrust regulators typically scrutinize proposed acquisitions.  More 
 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5378&context=faculty_scholarship. 
22. Carolyn Y. Johnson, Secret Rebates, Coupons and Exclusions: How the Battle over High 
Drug Prices Is Really Being Fought, WASH. POST (May 12, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/05/12/the-drug-price-arms-race-that-
leaves-patients-caught-in-the-middle/. 
23. David Blumenthal & David Squires, Drug Price Control: How Some Government Programs 
Do It, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 10, 2016), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/may/drug-price-control-how-some-
government-programs-do-it. 
24. Tor Constantino, IMS Health Study: U.S. Drug Spending Growth Reaches 8.5 Percent in 
2015, QUINTILESIMS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.imshealth.com/en/about-us/news/ims-health-
study-us-drug-spending-growth-reaches-8.5-percent-in-2015. 
25. Gregory Judd & Randy Vogenberg, Planning a Specialty Drug Strategy Through 2020, 
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (May 4, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-
topics/benefits/pages/specialty-drug-strategy.aspx. 
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important, it suggests that pricing strategies will continue along a 
segmentation strategy, in which firms will seek market rigidity or a 
market niche in which there is a lag in opportunities for competitors to 
respond with competing products. 
Such lags are highly sensitive to the surrounding regulatory framework 
that facilitates or deters entry.  The primary source of such lags in the 
United States is the pharmaceutical regulatory system under the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).  This time, lag means that 
companies with few, or no, competitors that raise prices on generic drugs 
will have the market to themselves until another firm is able to bring a 
competing drug through the Abbreviated New Drug Approval (“ANDA”) 
process, which often takes several years.26  Similarly, a company that 
introduces a breakthrough drug at high prices will have the market to 
themselves until competitors are able to discover, develop, and bring 
competing drugs through the New Drug Approval (“NDA”) or Biological 
Licensing Approval (“BLA”) process; this, again, can take several 
years.27 
Reciprocally, market structures also allow for competitive reactions 
that limit pricing power.  In many instances, new drugs that reach the 
market do lower list prices, deepen discounts, and reduce consumer 
prices.  For instance, the introduction of AbbVie’s Viekira Pak into the 
Hepatitis C market in 2016 led to extensive price competition with Gilead 
based on discounts in the tens of thousands of dollars to pharmaceutical 
insurance and benefit management companies.28  Similarly, Mylan 
steadily increased the list price of its patent-protected EpiPen.  When 
Mylan acquired the product in 2007, the list price was a little over $100, 
but its current price is over $600, largely reflecting strong market 
preference for the company’s proprietary technology for injecting the 
allergic reaction drug.29  Mylan indicated that it will also be launching a 
 
26. Clay P. Wiske et al., Options to Promote Competitive Generics Markets in the United States, 
314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2129, 2129 (Nov. 24, 2015). 
27. For example, Gilead’s breakthrough drugs—Sovaldi (introduced in 2013) and Harvoni 
(introduced in 2014) for the treatment of Hepatitis C—had list prices in the United States (before 
discounts) approaching $100,000 per treatment regimen.  See Paul Demko, New Hepatitis C Drug 
Costs Nearly $100,000, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Oct. 11, 2014), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141011/MAGAZINE/310119928. 
28. Max Nisen, Prices for the Miracle Drugs That Cure Hepatitis C Are Collapsing, QUARTZ 
(Feb. 5, 2015), http://qz.com/338840/prices-for-the-miracle-drugs-that-cure-hepatitis-c-are-
collapsing/. 
29. Max Jacobs, Don’t Blame Mylan for High Drug Prices, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2016, 2:27 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/11/07/dont-blame-mylan-for-high-drug-
prices/#5927e2a3ed5b; Mannching Sherry Ku, Recent Trends in Specialty Pharma Business 
Model, 23 J. FOOD & DRUG ANALYSIS 595, 597 (2015). 
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generic version at about half the price, in anticipation of Teva 
Pharmaceuticals launching a generic competitor, while continuing to 
offer the branded product.30  Again, while this is a market power issue, 
the pricing questions have little to do with industry-wide M&A trends.  
Indeed, industry reports in early 2017 suggest that alternatives to the 
EpiPen were rapidly eroding Mylan’s market share.31 
To the degree that market segmentation strategies are primarily 
responsible for price increases, it means that antitrust authorities should 
scrutinize specific biofunctional markets and evaluate mergers on 
whether a consolidated entity will have new pricing power within a 
specific pharmacological space or deter the entry of a pharmaceutical 
competitor.  If AbbVie, for instance, were to seek to purchase Gilead, 
there could be a case for evaluating the deal because it would eliminate 
all competition within a specific biofunctional market.  Similarly, Teva’s 
recent acquisition of Allergan’s generic drug lines warranted examination 
for potential market power in some product classes.32  But despite 
specific mergers that aggregate market power within a discernable 
submarket, it is not clear that the general trend in M&A activity warrants 
suspicion in terms of its impact on prices.  The larger lesson is that 
maintaining a competitive pharmaceutical marketplace requires assessing 
and improving the surrounding regulatory structure, more so than 
deterring megamergers. 
III.  M&A AND R&D—A CHANGING MARKET FOR DISCOVERY 
Perhaps even more important than the potential impact on prices, some 
observers and theorists suggest that M&A activity in the pharmaceutical 
sector might reduce innovative activity in the industry.33  Commentators 
 
30. Linda A. Johnson & Tom Murphy, Drugmaker Mylan Launching Cheaper EpiPen 
Following Price-Hike Backlash, TORONTO STAR (Aug. 29, 2016), 
https://www.thestar.com/business/2016/08/29/drugmaker-mylan-launching-cheaper-epipen-
following-price-hike-backlash.html. 
31. Arlene Weintraub, EpiPen: Alternatives Snatch up Market Share as Mylan’s Allergy Shot 
Falters: Report, FIERCEPHARMA (Mar. 7, 2017, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/epipen-alternatives-snatch-up-market-share-as-mylan-s-
allergy-shot-falters-report. 
32. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) evaluated the merger and ordered Teva to divest 
seventy-nine pharmaceutical products to preserve competition.  See Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, FTC Requires Teva to Divest Over 75 Generic Drugs to Settle Competition Concerns 
Related to its Acquisition of Allergan’s Generic Business (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/07/ftc-requires-teva-divest-over-75-generic-
drugs-rival-firms-settle. 
33. See BRUNO CASSIMAN & MASSIMO G. COLOMBO, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: THE 
INNOVATION IMPACT 75 (2006). 
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not only worry that industry consolidation increases prices, but also that 
it reduces incentives to innovate.34  These commentators express concern 
that large pharmaceutical firms exhibited diminishing R&D 
productivity—producing fewer discoveries, generating less valuable 
discoveries, and creating discoveries that represent more incremental and 
duplicative innovations.35  In parallel, commentators suggest that the 
recent merger trend contributed to big pharma’s diminishing innovation, 
in part because mergers are often followed by layoffs in R&D personnel, 
changes in management and research priorities, and reductions in total 
R&D spending.36 
Our review of data measuring pharmaceutical innovation, however, 
tells a different story.  First, even as merger activity in the United States 
increased over the past ten years, there has been a steady upward trend of 
FDA approvals of new molecular entities (“NMEs”) and new biological 
products (“BLAs”).37  Hence, the industry has been highly successful in 
bringing new products to the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34. Giovanni Valentini, Measuring the Effect of M&A on Patenting Quantity and Quality, 33 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 336, 338 (2012). 
35. See, e.g., Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 428 (June 2011). 
36. See, e.g., Justus Haucap & Joel Stiebale, Research: Innovation Suffers When Drug 
Companies Merge, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/research-innovation-
suffers-when-drug-companies-merge (noting that research and development (“R&D”) and 
“patenting within the merged entity decline substantially after a merger”); see Peter Loftus et al., 
In Drug Mergers, There’s One Sure Bet: The Layoffs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:12 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304393704579532141039817448 (noting how 
many workers have had to seek jobs elsewhere after large pharma mergers). 
37. See infra Figure 3 (showing approvals from 1940 to 2015). 
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FIGURE 3: Trends in FDA Drug Approvals, 1940–201538 
 
In addition, the diversity of firms carrying out R&D in the industry 
grew strikingly.  Figure 4 denotes the status of firms receiving approvals 
from the FDA since 1979, and it illustrates the growing importance of 
“bio and specialty firms” and of (to a lesser degree) Japanese companies 
as drug developers for the United States and other markets.  Although 
established United States and European firms continue to be important 
sources of new products, a vast array of specialized firms, ranging from 
large biological companies such as Amgen and Biogen to a globally 
distributed set of smaller specialists, now lead the industry.  This 
fragmentation of the development base reflects both the increasing 
complexity of science underlying pharmaceutical products and the 
growing global scope of R&D expertise. 
 
 
 
 
 
38. The peak in 1996–98 occurred following the implementation of the Prescription Drug User 
Fee Act (“PDUFA”), which allowed the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to 
collect fees from drug manufacturers to fund the new drug approval process and thereby expedite 
approvals the cleared out a backlog of applications.  The source of the Figure 4’s data is based on 
the Authors’ calculations using data from Drugs@FDA: FDA Approved Drug Products, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Reports.ReportsMe
nu (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Drugs@FDA]. 
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FIGURE 4: Status of Firms Receiving FDA Drug Approvals (NDAs 
& BLAs), 1979–201539 
 
This fragmentation and diversification of discovery reveals one 
significant reason why pharmaceutical M&A activity increased.  While 
established pharma companies such as Pfizer, Merck, GlaxoSmithKline 
(“GSK”), Eli Lilly, and Novartis continue to develop new drugs in their 
own labs, they are becoming increasingly dependent on acquiring other 
firms to fuel their new product lines.  The locus of innovation is shifting 
from inside large firms to smaller start-ups and to firms operating in 
nontraditional geographic markets and complementary product markets.  
As a result, the pharmaceutical industry appears to be in significant 
structural transition, and the surge of acquisitions reflects that transition. 
A number of forces are contributing to these industry changes.  First, 
some medical researchers suggest that the frontier of discovery is moving 
away from small molecules—which has been the core of large pharma 
research—and toward biologics and delivery systems.  One reason for 
this shift might be diminishing opportunities to discover new molecular 
innovations.  Some academic physicians believe that the molecular space 
available for new discovery for small molecules is finite, and that current 
pharmacological technology is pressing against those upper limits.40  
Meanwhile, the growth of research on biologics is rapidly expanding, and 
 
39. The source of Figure 5’s data is based on the Authors’ calculations based on data from the 
FDA’ report.  Id. 
40. For a discussion of technical challenges of the small-molecular drug discovery process, see 
Swen Hoelder et al., Discovery of Small Molecule Cancer Drugs: Successes, Challenges and 
Opportunities, 6 MOLECULAR ONCOLOGY 155, 169 (2012). 
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meaningful innovation is coming from research in biological 
interventions (some call this the “biological revolution,” as biologicals 
constituted more than one third of approvals in 2015).  Traditional large 
pharmaceutical firms do not have dominant expertise in this scientific 
area, and the shift away from small-compound interventions and toward 
alternatives means a corresponding shift of innovation away from 
established pharmaceutical firms.  Thus, established firms must pursue 
strategic acquisitions to sustain sales and pursue market opportunities 
now available from biological discoveries.  The growth of new sources 
of discovery creates both growing scientific breadth in the industry’s 
underlying knowledge base and increasing market complexity, both 
domestically and globally.41 
Another significant change in the market for innovation is the decline 
in costs and resources required to pursue meaningful innovation.  The 
growing codification of scientific knowledge has increased the role of 
information technology (“IT”) on research.  Thus, information for basic 
research is much easier both to transmit and to obtain.  As a result, start-
up biotech firms have been able to pursue meaningful innovations while 
remaining small.  Consequently, competition for discovery of new 
pharmaceutical therapies is robust, and consolidation of big pharma 
companies does not seem to threaten the competitiveness of this upstream 
market for innovation. 
Yet while large and established pharmaceutical companies no longer 
have the dominant presence in discovery they once did, they still maintain 
an important comparative advantage over smaller firms from their 
ownership of large-scale marketing networks in multiple countries.  
Small firms developing drugs typically do not have the marketing 
capabilities required to bring those new drugs to global and segmented 
markets on their own.  This need for global reach has been accelerated by 
the growth of pharmaceutical sales in emerging markets.  Where the 
major markets were once concentrated in North America, Western 
Europe, and Japan, multiple emerging markets in Asia, South America, 
and elsewhere are now key targets for global pharmaceutical firms.42  
 
41. Abhirup Chakrabarti & Will Mitchell, A Corporate Level Perspective on Acquisitions and 
Integration, in 4 ADVANCES IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1, 4–6 (Sydney Finkelstein & Cary 
Cooper eds., 2004); Elena Vidal & Will Mitchell, Adding by Subtracting: The Relationship Between 
Performance Feedback and Resource Reconfiguration Through Divestitures, 26 ORG. SCI. 1101, 
1101 (2015). 
42. QUINTILESIMS, TOP-LINE MARKET DATA: GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET SIZE & 
GROWTH BY REGION, 2014–2019, http://www.imshealth.com/files/web/Corporate/News/Top-
Line%20Market%20Data/Global%20Prescription%20Sales%20Information5%20World%20figur
es%20by%20Region%202015-2019.pdf (last visited May 16, 2017) [hereinafter Top-Line Market 
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Indeed, China alone is now one of the top three pharmaceutical markets 
in the world, about level with Japan and markedly behind only the United 
States.43  To succeed, established pharmaceutical companies now require 
global reach, while smaller players seeking to expand often need to 
acquire regional development and/or commercialization targets.  Figure 
5 highlights the growing importance of a broader range of pharmaceutical 
markets, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, and Figure 6 depicts the 
proportion of acquisition targets that were based in the United States, 
Western Europe, and Asia between 1991 and 2015.  The share of targets 
in the United States and Europe declined from over 40 percent each in 
the early 1990s to about 20–25 percent by 2015, while the share of targets 
based in Asia (other than Japan) grew rapidly, approaching 40 percent in 
2015. 
 
FIGURE 5: Trends in Global Pharmaceutical Sales in Billions, 1999–
201544 
 
 
 
 
 
Data]. 
43. U.S. DEP’T OF COM.: INT’L TRADE ADMIN., 2016 TOP MARKETS SERIES: 
PHARMACEUTICALS COUNTRY CASE STUDY FOR CHINA 1 (2016), 
http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Pharmaceuticals_China.pdf. 
44. The source of Figure 5’s data was the Authors’ calculations based on data from IMS Health.  
Top-Line Market Data, supra note 42. 
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FIGURE 6: Trends in Location of M&A Targets by Acquirers, 1991–
201545 
 
Serving such a disparate global market requires both refinements to 
products to suit local demand and local presence for development, 
regulatory, and marketing activity.  While some of the expansion can 
build on existing internal skills or alliances with local partners, creating 
a strong local base in multiple markets commonly requires purchasing 
firms that already have a relevant presence. 
For these reasons, many smaller firms with valuable discoveries opt to 
sell their innovative products, and often the entire company, to an 
established firm that wants to fill its pipeline.46  Such deals provide an 
efficient way to leverage existing investments in marketing systems at the 
established companies, and they explain much of the growth in M&A 
activity that occurred during the past two decades.47 
 
45. Description 2834: Pharmaceutical Preparations, U.S. DEPT. LABOR, 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.display?id=608&tab=description (last visited Apr. 18, 
2017) (describing Standard Industry Classification (“SIC”) 2834 (Pharmaceutical Preparations)).  
The depicted deals total 83 percent of globally reported deals in 2015, with the remaining 17 percent 
distributed across the world.  The source of Figure 6’s data was the Authors’ calculations based on 
Thomson Reuters’ Investment Banking Deal Activity.  SDC Platinum Database, supra note 6. 
46. LAURENCE CAPRON & WILL MITCHELL, BUILD, BORROW, OR BUY: SOLVING THE 
GROWTH DILEMMA 136 (2012). 
47. Mid-sized and smaller firms in the sector—not just the traditional big-pharma firms—also 
commonly use acquisitions to gain access to capabilities that they need to develop further.  In 2015, 
for instance, of 506 M&A deals listed in the Thomson Reuters Recap data base, 11 percent of the 
buyers were established pharmaceutical industry leaders, 23 percent were mid-sized pharma and 
life sciences firms, and 66 percent were smaller firms and diversifying entrants.  Hence, M&A is 
as much or more part of the means by which newer actors attempt to build new positions in the 
sector.  Recap Database, supra note 7. 
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Another comparative advantage established firms have over start-ups 
is their access to the financing required to obtain FDA approval, and 
especially to fund Phase-III human trials or large scale trials at earlier 
phases.  For this reason, start-ups frequently sell their discoveries to large 
pharmaceutical firms prior to FDA approval and commercialization.  
Accordingly, large pharmaceutical firms are occupying a different role in 
drug development.  Rather than primarily being creators of innovation—
investing in R&D and managing a soup-to-nuts operation—these firms 
are increasingly functioning as purchasers of innovations and are adding 
value to the downstream regulatory and commercialization processes. 
Perhaps ironically, many of the megamergers contributed to, rather 
than squelched, the competitiveness of this process.  Mergers often result 
in the departures of important executives, and many of those executives 
then form new ventures that aid in turning discoveries—often the 
discoveries they helped develop before departing to the large company—
into commercialized products.  One trend is to form small companies that 
purchase the rights to specific compounds, contract with firms to conduct 
the appropriate clinical trials to win FDA approval, and then sell to a large 
pharmaceutical company for distribution and marketing.  Such ventures 
are called “virtual companies” because they conduct neither research nor 
clinical tests themselves, but manage the development-to-
commercialization process through contracting agents.  They signal a 
new disaggregation of the pharmaceutical industry that dilutes many 
concerns for industry concentration. 
One remaining question is whether small companies—whether start-
ups engaged in R&D, virtual companies that rely on contracting services, 
or even mid-sized clinical trial companies that take ownership of 
discoveries—will find the capital to pay for substantial clinical trials.  
Even if the industry is moving toward further disaggregation, 
megamergers might harm competition if it means fewer parties are 
available to finance the development process.  But the emergence of 
venture capital (“VC”) in the health care sector helps mitigate any 
monopsony power that large pharmaceutical companies might have for 
new discoveries.  Even though large pharmaceutical firms are 
increasingly relying on purchasing rather than producing innovation (it is 
likely that over 25 percent of total sales of the twenty largest 
pharmaceutical firms now come from in-licensed products), the flow of 
VC into the health sector has increased significantly in recent years, with 
health sector VC representing 31 percent of total VC investments in 
2007.48 
 
48. See infra Figure 7 (noting the annual venture capital investment in the health care sector). 
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FIGURE 7: Annual VC Investment in the Health Care Sector, 1998–
2007. 
 
Although the number of VC investors declined during this recent 
economic downturn, VC will remain an important part of health care 
innovation in the years to come. 
Whether VC is a reliable source of funding for Phase III and other 
human trials, however, is an open question.  Venture capitalists view 
FDA review and Medicare and insurance reimbursement policies as 
sources of significant risk that steer VC investments toward firms that do 
not focus exclusively on health care.  Though venture capitalists looked 
into funding Phase-III trials, they achieved few successes to date.  The 
role of VC is especially important because although the market for 
discovery is vibrant, it is also fragile, with up to 50 percent of listed firms 
at risk of going bankrupt in 2017 and many currently trading at less than 
cash value.49  If the finance and VC markets cannot adequately fund the 
innovation process, then large pharmaceutical firms with significant cash 
on hand and reliable sources of income from currently commercialized 
drugs will have an advantage in the market for purchasing discoveries. 
Although VC and third-party funding slowed with the current 
downturn, companies of all sizes are still able to attract sufficient funding 
to carry discoveries forward, and the market should remain vibrant for 
players in addition to big pharma firms.  This suggests that recent 
megamergers have not sufficiently concentrated either the market for 
discoveries to harm the rate of innovation.  Thus, there remains an 
adequate number of parties capable of shepherding discoveries through 
 
49. Michael Brush, Dozens of Biotech Companies are ‘Free’ for Investors Taking, 
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 16, 2016, 9:18 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/dozens-of-
biotech-companies-are-free-for-investors-taking-2016-02-16. 
13_RICHMAN (787-819).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2017  12:01 PM 
2017] Pharmaceutical M&A Activity 807 
to commercialization. 
In short, we are witnessing a major structural change in the locus of 
biomedical research.  The three trends discussed herein—that innovation 
is increasingly occurring within start-ups, that large pharmaceutical 
companies are increasingly relying on in-licensed products, and that 
megamergers are potentially concentrating the market for buyers of 
innovation—will lead to major changes in drug discovery.  Although it is 
unclear whether megamergers stifled innovation within this new industry 
paradigm, the data do not conclusively suggest that mergers have actually 
created harm. 
IV.  DOES M&A ACTIVITY DISRUPT RESEARCH AND PRODUCT 
INTRODUCTION? 
Even if the surge in recent M&A activity has not reduced industry-
wide drug approvals, some observers and theorists suggested that M&A 
deals might reduce innovative activity by disrupting innovative 
capabilities at the firm level.  Because acquisitions require organizational 
changes at both the target and acquiring firms, many employees from 
both sides of a deal commonly seek alternative employment following an 
acquisition, either because they chose to move on or because of the 
downsizing that often occurs during acquisition integration.  Integrating 
the different research, development, trials, and regulatory systems of the 
target and acquirer, meanwhile, is a complicated task.  As a result, there 
is potential for disruption in R&D labs, clinical trials units, and other parts 
of the newly combined firm. 
The question of whether acquisition deals systematically deter 
innovative activity is best answered from a longitudinal analysis of 
pharmaceutical firm performance.  One of the authors in this Article 
recorded the number of deals by seventeen firms, including thirteen major 
established companies and four substantial pharma specialists, from 1985 
to 2009.  The seventeen firms undertook 556 M&A deals with reported 
value of $67.6 billion during this period.  For these same firms, we also 
gathered data from 1990 to 2014 for sales ($6.0 trillion revenue in the 
twenty-five-year period), R&D expenditures ($946 billion expenditure in 
the period), and drug approvals by the FDA (1,213 approvals), as well as 
the number of clinical trials initiated from 2000 to 2013 (14,614 trials).  
We then investigated whether firms with more acquisition deals had 
greater or lesser subsequent innovative activity.  We caution that the 
investigation is exploratory; we cannot determine causality from the 
analysis, but can identify relevant longitudinal patterns. 
We first consider the relationship between acquisitions and R&D 
expenditures.  Panel A of Table 1 shows that firms with more M&A 
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activity in a five-year period, whether based on reported value or number 
of deals, tended to have lower R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales 
the next five years (i.e., the correlations were negative).  In Panel B, we 
also examined selling, general, and administrative (“SG&A”) costs 
during the same period, which track closely with marketing expenditures, 
most commonly finding similar negative correlations.  The core 
implication here is that firms that are most active in acquiring companies 
subsequently invested less in both internal R&D and marketing relative 
to their sales levels. 
 
TABLE 1: Relationship Between Firms’ Levels of M&A Activity and 
Subsequent R&D and SG&A Expenditures as a Percent of Sales 
(Seventeen Firms) 
Correlations: M&A v. R&D & 
SG&A (Lagged Five-Year 
Periods) 
Acquisition 
Value Acquisition # 
Panel A.  R&D/Sales Expenditure   
Acquisitions, 1985–89 v. 
R&D/Sales, 1990–94 -0.10 -0.21 
Acquisitions, 1990–94 v. 
R&D/Sales, 1995–99 -0.16 -0.32 
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v. 
R&D/Sales, 2000–04 -0.28 -0.29 
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v. 
R&D/Sales, 2005–09 -0.37 -0.26 
Acquisitions, 2005–2009 v. 
R&D/Sales, 2010–13 -0.05 -0.06 
Panel B.  SG&A/Sales 
Expenditure   
Acquisitions, 1985–89 v. 
SG&A/Sales, 1990–94 0.20 0.25 
Acquisitions, 1990–94 v. 
SG&A/Sales, 1995–99 -0.15 -0.32 
Acquisitions, 1995-99 v. 
SG&A/Sales, 2000–04 -0.17 -0.24 
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v. 
SG&A/Sales, 2005–09 -0.15 -0.04 
Acquisitions, 2005–29 v. 
SG&A/Sales, 2010–13 0.01 -0.06 
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Nonetheless, parsimony in R&D expenditure is not necessarily a 
negative sign for product development productivity.  Instead, lower R&D 
and sales may reflect greater efficiency in R&D investments.  The more 
important question is whether these acquisition-active firms also had 
lower success in bringing new products into clinical trials and, ultimately, 
to the market. 
Table 2 reports the correlation relationships for three five-year periods 
of acquisition and subsequent clinical trial activity.  The results in Panel 
A, for all clinical trials, suggest that greater M&A activity most 
commonly has, at least, a moderately positive relationship with bringing 
potential new drugs into human trials.  The simplest interpretation is that 
acquisitions often help firms gain access to drugs for their clinical trials 
pipelines, complementing their internal development activities.  Thus, 
even though internal R&D/sales ratios may decline, overall introduction 
into the clinical pipeline increases with greater M&A activity. 
We then investigated whether the patterns differ by stage of clinical 
trial to explore whether the acquisitions tend to be targeted early in 
development pipelines (Phase I trials) or whether they take place closer 
to market entry (Phase III trials).  Panel B, examining early-stage Phase 
I trials, offers mixed results, with negative relationships for two of three 
cohorts by acquisition value, but positive relationships for all cohorts by 
number of acquisitions.  Panel C, examining later Phase III trials, has 
mainly positive correlations.  There is some hint here, then, that firms 
undertaking larger acquisitions may be focused further down the pipeline 
(Phase III), while firms undertaking many smaller deals gain pipeline 
opportunities both early and late in the development phases (both Phase 
I and III).  Overall, acquisitions appear to help firms gain access to 
potential products. 
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TABLE 2: Relationship Between Firms’ Levels of M&A Activity and 
Launching Clinical Trials (Seventeen Firms) 
Correlations: M&A v. Clinical 
Trials and FDA Approvals  
(Lagged Five-Year Periods) 
Acquisition 
Value 
Acquisition # 
Panel A.  All Clinical Trials   
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v. Clinical 
Trials, 2000–04 
-0.13 0.41 
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v. Clinical 
Trials, 2005–09 
0.09 0.30 
Acquisitions, 2005–09 v. Clinical 
Trials, 2010–13 
0.52 0.47 
Panel B.  Phase I Trials 
  
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v. Phase I 
Trials, 2000–04 
-0.33 0.55 
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v. Phase I 
Trials, 2005–09 
-0.11 0.16 
Acquisitions, 2005–09 v. Phase I 
Trials, 2010–13 
0.25 0.26 
Panel C.  Phase III Trials 
  
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v. Phase III 
Trials, 2000–04 
0.18 0.01 
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v. Phase III 
Trials, 2005–09 
-0.04 0.23 
Acquisitions, 2005–09 v. Phase III 
Trials, 2010–13 
0.57 0.39 
Panel D.  FDA Approvals   
Acquisitions, 1985–89 v. 
Approvals, 1990–94 
0.39 0.36 
Acquisitions, 1990–94 v. 
Approvals, 1995–99 
0.75 0.48 
Acquisitions, 1995–99 v. 
Approvals, 2000–04 
0.09 0.49 
Acquisitions, 2000–04 v. 
Approvals, 2005–09 
-0.01 0.25 
Acquisitions, 2005–09 v. 
Approvals, 2010–13 
0.51 0.42 
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Simply bringing a molecule into clinical trials, however, is no 
guarantee of market entry.  Even at Phase III, products fail and never 
reach the market.  Therefore, we examine the correlation between M&A 
activity and FDA approvals of new drugs, reported in Panel D.  These 
correlations are almost all moderately positive.  The most direct 
implication is that firms most active in M&A activity also are the firms 
most capable of bringing new drugs successfully into the market.  The 
approvals may arise from drug pipelines that acquirers obtain with their 
targets.  It is also possible, of course, that the opposite causality arises, in 
which firms that are most successful in introducing new drugs have 
resources needed to undertake more acquisitions.  In either direction of 
causality, though, it appears that M&A activity is an active part of the 
strategy of the firms that are most successful in bringing new products to 
market. 
These results are consistent with our observations in Part III of this 
Article: that acquisitions are often a consequence of, on one hand, the 
spread of the industry’s innovation activity across a heterogeneous 
spectrum of firms and geographies, and on the other, a sustained 
comparative advantage by large traditional firms to bring products 
through the regulatory process and to market.  These results further 
suggest that rather than disrupt innovative activity, M&A activity often 
supports product development and market introduction. 
A deeper question is whether changes in firms’ M&A activity—such 
as a temporal surge in acquisitions—might disrupt their innovation 
output.  Table 3 measures the effect of whether a change in a firm’s 
acquisition activity from one five-year period to the subsequent five-year 
period affects either the firm’s clinical trials (reported in Panel A) or 
approvals (reported in Panel B).  The question examined in Table 3 is 
whether firms that increase their rate of acquisitions, whether in value or 
number of deals, encounter disruptions as they engage in the extra effort 
of integrating their targets. 
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TABLE 3: Relationship Between Firms’ Levels of M&A Activity and 
Changes in Clinical Trials and FDA Approval (Seventeen Firms) 
 
The evidence reported in Table 3 is mixed, showing that a change in 
acquisition activity has a volatile relationship with change in approvals 
and trials, sometimes positive and sometimes negative.  The implication 
is that ramping up deal making can be helpful, but it also may disrupt 
existing routines and practices strongly enough to hamper pipeline 
activities. 
Recent history offers several examples of both negative and positive 
changes arising from accelerated acquisition activity.  Pfizer, for instance, 
grew its deal-making activity during the early 1990s, with several 
moderate-sized deals such as purchasing Schneider NAMIC U.S.A. 
Corp. and making equity investments in Neurogen and Incyte, gaining 
Change in M&A v. Change in 
Clinical Trials & FDA Approvals  
(Lagged Five-Year Increases) 
Acquisition 
Value 
Acquisition # 
Panel A.  Change in Clinical 
Trials 
  
Acquisition Change, 1995–99 to 
2000–04 v. Trials Change, 2000–04 
to 2005–09 
0.13 0.01 
Acquisition Change, 2000–04 to 
2005–09 v. Trials Change, 2005–09 
to 2010–13 
-0.41 -0.39 
Panel B.  Change in FDA 
Approvals 
  
Acquisition Change, 1985–89 to 
1990–94 v. Approvals Change, 
1990–94 to 1995–99 
0.73 0.36 
Acquisition Change, 1990–94 to 
1995–99 v. Approvals Change, 
1995–99 to 2000–04 
-0.57 -0.22 
Acquisition Change, 1995–99 to 
2000–04 v. Approvals Change, 
2000–04 to 2005–09 
0.22 0.25 
Acquisition Change, 2000–04 to 
2005–09 v. Approvals Change, 
2005–09 to 2010–14 
-0.69 -0.49 
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technology that led to gains in trials and approvals in the late 1990s.50  
The company went through another burst of acquisition activity in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, including deals for Warner-Lambert (gaining 
the anti-cholesterol drug Lipitor) and Pharmacia (gaining the anti-
inflammatory drug Celebrex), which helped the company become the 
world’s largest pharmaceutical company.51  But the new growth deals 
were followed by a decline in trials and approvals in subsequent years 
and Pfizer eventually lost its number one revenue position.  Reliance on 
gaining products via deal making may have inhibited the ability to bring 
new products into the pipeline. 
Sometimes, however, what appear to be disruptions can instead 
prepare the foundation for future growth.  Abbott (now AbbVie) 
increased its deal making in the late 1990s, buying multiple companies 
and attempting to acquire Alza in 1999 ($7.3 billion).52  Time spent on 
due diligence, integration, and break up appears to have detracted 
attention from the company’s ongoing clinical activity and slowed 
subsequent trials and approvals.  Yet this deal activity helped lay the 
groundwork for its later acquisition of BASF/Knoll in 2000 (for $6.9 
billion), which brought with it the technology that led to trials and 
approvals of Humira, which is used to treat rheumatoid arthritis and other 
autoimmune diseases, and that subsequently became the world’s top 
selling drug later in the 2000s.53  Similarly, Glaxo (now GSK) exhibited 
a burst of M&A activity in the late 1990s, particularly with the $14.3 
billion acquisition of Burroughs Wellcome in 1994–95.54  The work 
required to assess and integrate the deals appeared to have disrupted 
subsequent pipeline activity in the early 2000s, but it also laid the 
groundwork for future growth, with GSK reaching the status as one of 
the world’s most successful pharmaceutical companies during the 
2000s.55 
Clearly, the negative relationships signal some concern about deal 
 
50. J.A. ROELS, THE ORIGIN AND THE EVOLUTION OF FIRMS: INFORMATION AS A DRIVING 
FORCE 164 (2012). 
51. Matthew Herper, Pfizer Buys Pharmacia for $60 Billion, FORBES (July 15, 2002, 7:53 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/2002/07/15/0715pfe.html. 
52. James P. Miller, Abbott Laboratories to Purchase Alza for Stock Worth $7.3 Billion, WALL 
ST. J. (June 22, 1999, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB930002503336706177. 
53. Thomas M. Burton, Abbott Laboratories Agrees to Buy BASF’s Knoll Pharmaceutical Unit, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2000, 12:13 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB976832374667325423. 
54. Richard W. Stevenson, Glaxo Offers $14 Billion for Wellcome, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/24/business/company-news-glaxo-offers-14-billion-for-
wellcome.html. 
55. Sylvia Pfeifer, The Drugs Don’t Work for GlaxoSmithKline, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 9, 2007, 
12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/migrationtemp/2815417/The-drugs-dont-work-
for-GlaxoSmithKline.html. 
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activity, but it is important not to overstate the concerns.  Once firms 
settle at a new rate of deal activity, they are likely to learn how to handle 
the new level and return to more positive patterns.  Nonetheless, the 
patterns do raise cautionary notes for pharmaceutical managers.  They 
also offer warning signals for antitrust regulators that are being told of 
efficiencies purported to arise from a proposed merger. 
V.  UNTRADITIONAL SOURCES OF ANTICOMPETITIVE HARM: MARKETING 
AND REGULATORY BOTTLENECKS 
The previous three Parts of this Article suggest that broad trends in 
pharmaceutical acquisitions, and recent megamergers in particular, do 
not present traditional competition concerns for pharmaceutical prices 
and output.  Research and discovery remain robust, albeit commonly 
from small firms pursuing large molecules and biologics rather than the 
small molecule discoveries that built the current pharmaceutical giants.  
Reductions in the cost of doing research, actualized by merging two 
research departments into one, enable entry and facilitate active 
competition for new discoveries.  Even if the internal research 
productivity of some large pharmaceutical companies has declined, these 
firms have also become purchasers of innovation.  This is true even as 
these firms continue as creators of innovation, and their purchases fuel 
the discovery process and enable the commercialization of many new 
products.  The rise of virtual companies, companies that contract to do 
Phase-III human trials, and other small facilitating companies (some 
staffed by executives who were dismissed by newly merged giants) built 
an active and competitive market for commercializing discoveries.  And 
even if a surge in firm M&A activity sometimes dulls innovative 
productivity, acquisitions appear to be an important part of both 
sustaining product development and even laying the foundation for long-
term innovation activity.  These developments mitigated most concerns 
that megamergers would reduce the competitiveness of discovery. 
This Part explores two additional sources of concern about the sector’s 
growing merger activity: whether industry concentration in marketing 
and distributing pharmaceuticals will distort consumption (and thereby 
increase prices or disrupt innovation strategies), and whether industry 
concentration causes regulatory bottlenecks that result in anticompetitive 
consequences. 
A.  New Systems of Distribution 
Pharmaceutical sales remain highly influenced by the effectiveness of 
targeted marketing, and large pharmaceutical companies have therefore 
invested heavily in specialized sales forces.  Many companies treat these 
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investments as fixed costs that cannot vary with the firm’s research 
productivity, so firms purchase discoveries to maximally utilize the sales 
force capacities.  Treating sales forces as fixed costs that would go 
unutilized without actively marketed products is one leading explanation 
for the steady frequency of acquisitions and the surge of megamergers. 
The importance of sales forces accordingly attracts competition 
concerns when two companies with significant marketing operations 
decide to merge.  Concentration in the market for pharmaceutical sales 
and distribution might lead to market power and all of its ill effects, 
including squeezing out superior competing products, higher prices, 
foreclosing possible entry by innovative competitors, and diminished 
consumer choice.  But two significant changes in the marketing of 
pharmaceuticals might alleviate these competition concerns, and these 
mergers instead might reflect large pharmaceutical companies’ shared 
perception that the industry has great excess marketing capacity that is 
being displaced by alternative distribution mechanisms. 
One recent development affecting, and perhaps blindsiding, 
pharmaceutical marketing is the growing popularity of health care IT, 
including the proliferation of medical protocols.  Whereas 
pharmaceutical marketing relies on the assumption that physicians 
prescribe drugs based on personal familiarity and comfort with certain 
compounds, the growth of electronic medical protocols would lead 
physicians to instead rely on codified instructions disseminated through 
IT systems. 
The promise of IT to transform the delivery of medicine is not a new 
idea—health policy analysts have long been enthusiastic about its 
potential to bring more consistency to medical services, reduce errors, 
and constrain costs.  And even as entrenched barriers impede the spread 
of systematized IT medicine,56 including the training of doctors, the use 
of IT and electronic standardized protocols is growing in several systems, 
such as Kaiser Permanente’s HealthConnect program.  Moreover, 
enthusiasm for, and recent investments in, cost-effectiveness research 
might also stimulate greater use of electronic protocols.  If cost-
effectiveness research can document the comparative usefulness of 
alternative regimens, then electronic protocols would swiftly spread the 
information and standardize treatments. 
The growing importance of PBMs also marks a change in how drugs 
are prescribed and consumed.  PBMs purchase drugs in bulk on behalf of 
insurers and use formularies and coverage tiering to direct insureds (and 
 
56. Susan Denzter, Health Information Technology: On the Fast Track at Last?, 28 HEALTH 
AFF. 320, 320 (2009). 
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thus prescribing physicians) toward certain prescriptions.  The rise of 
PBMs leaves less latitude to physicians and patients in selecting 
particular drugs for prescriptions and means that companies must now 
direct pharmaceutical marketing information at PBMs, rather than 
individual physicians.  A similar development occurred in the early 
1990s, when the Clinton Health Plan proposed greater monitoring and 
restrictions on the selection of prescriptions.57  Large pharmaceutical 
companies recognized that prescription selections would reduce the value 
of large sales forces, and these firms transferred investments away from 
traditional marketing and toward purchases of PBMs.  The attempts to 
use the PBMs to generate profitability failed dismally, however, and the 
three major pharmaceutical companies that acquired PBMs 
(SmithKlineBeecham, Eli Lilly, and Merck) subsequently divested or 
spun them off, typically at losses or with significantly lower market 
capitalization than their acquisition costs.  In turn, though, the PBM 
sector is now a vibrant part of the pharmaceutical value chain, including 
standalone PBMs and PBMs that are units within health insurance 
companies and drug store chains.  Thus, the failed acquisitions of the 
PBMs by pharmaceutical leaders did not lead to failure of industry 
structure.  Instead, the failures led to successful changes in market 
structure. 
The impact of cost-effectiveness research, the growing use of IT, and 
the consolidated drug selections and purchases by PBMs could 
potentially obviate the need for vast marketing teams and sales forces.  
The information required by treating physicians would be transmitted by 
electronic mechanisms rather than in-person instruction sessions with 
sales representatives, and many prescription decisions might be removed 
from individual physicians altogether and instead given to well-informed 
bulk purchasers.  Large pharmaceutical companies might have already 
recognized that these seismic changes are afoot, and their pursuit of 
recent megamergers might reflect their need to address overcapacity in 
marketing and sales.  This would mean that market concentration in this 
downstream market should not translate into anticompetitive 
consequences. 
While it is still unknown how significantly information systems will 
impact physician treatments and the issuances of pharmaceutical 
prescriptions, the growth of electronic protocols is potentially another 
major development that could transform the competitive structure of the 
pharmaceutical industry.  An accurate competitive analysis would have 
 
57. Walter A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, 13 HEALTH 
AFF. 9, 10 (1994). 
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to take these changes into account, and future research could fruitfully 
examine the effect of electronic protocols both on physician behavior and 
on the usefulness of pharmaceutical sales representatives. 
B.  The Remaining Bottleneck: FDA Approval 
The one area that seems to have the potential for competitive harm 
through market concentration is the process of obtaining regulatory 
approval.  We interviewed several industry experts deeply familiar with 
the regulatory process.  Consistent with discussions in the health services 
literature,58 the experts suggest that the regulatory process remains a 
nonstandardized, and even personalized, process.  It consequently 
rewards certain competencies that are in short supply and difficult to 
replicate.  As one expert on the regulatory process remarked: 
I don’t think you’ll ever do away with the need of regulatory specialists 
who interface between your data and decision making.  [This will 
become increasingly important as] we not only have approval but we 
have payment, which has been connected in Europe for a while, [and] 
it’s going to be connected in the U.S.  It has to be.  And so you’ll need 
people who can navigate that no matter what.59 
Others we interviewed expressed a similar concern, that the regulatory 
process remains a bottleneck, in part because of the complexity of the 
regulatory demands and the differences in regulatory requirements across 
jurisdictions.  While many contract research organizations have expertise 
in the regulatory process at the FDA, each class of products requires 
specific regulatory insight and knowledge.  Consequently, recent entrants 
to the value chain for drug commercialization are challenged to translate 
industry success into an effective interface with regulators.  Although 
there appears to be entry into the markets for discovery and 
commercialization, it is less apparent that there is effective entry into this 
regulatory phase that requires nonmarket capabilities. 
With the recent passage of the 21st Century Cures Act,60 the FDA will 
soon institute some reforms on its drug approval process.  Perhaps this 
regulatory reform will reduce the centrality of certain skills, relationships, 
and knowhow that facilitates the FDA and other government agency 
approvals.  Perhaps it will make the regulatory approval process more 
accessible to developers, thereby increasing meaningful competition.  
 
58. See generally Robert M. Califf, Benefit-Risk Assessments at the US Food and Drug 
Administration: Finding the Balance, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 693, 693 (2017) (noting the FDA’s 
“system of rigorous, independent premarket assessment” that it uses when making marketing 
decisions). 
59. Interview with Barak Richman, Will Mitchell, Elena Vidal, and Kevin Schulman (Spring 
2009). 
60. Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016). 
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But the novel technologies envisioned by the 21st Century Cures Act will 
require the development of new predictable, scientific, and transparent 
approval pathways.  The presence of a regulatory bottleneck does expose 
a vulnerability to market concentration.  If few firms possess the ability 
to navigate through the regulatory process, then mergers among those 
firms could translate into harm to competition.  Our interviews suggest 
that the regulatory process and the possibilities for regulatory reform 
deserve attention as the consequences of megamergers are evaluated and 
scrutinized. 
Market access through the reimbursement process of public and 
private payors is an additional hurdle to product adoption and uptake in 
the market.  Similar to the regulatory process, the reimbursement process 
requires specialized insights and knowledge that provide additional 
uncertainty in the economic model for drug development.  This 
specialized knowledge and additional risk posed by this step could also 
inhibit investment in early stage life sciences companies. 
CONCLUSION 
The global pharmaceutical industry is exhibiting meaningful structural 
changes, evidenced most clearly by ongoing growth in industry-wide 
M&A deals.  This exploratory review finds evidence that the predominant 
concerns over megamergers among pharmaceutical giants might be 
misplaced.  Changes in the scientific landscape of competitive innovation 
generated a vibrant marketplace for discovery, which megamergers do 
not necessarily threaten and instead might actually invigorate.  Although 
megamergers may create some monopsony power for the purchase of 
discoveries, an active VC and biotech financing market, along with 
speculating contract research organizations and virtual companies, would 
counteract that.  And the development of alternative information 
mechanisms to spread pharmaceutical information and effectiveness 
data, which would inform physicians and bulk purchasers of drugs, 
reduces the importance of pharmacy sales representatives, thus mitigating 
any competition concerns with downstream drug marketing and 
distribution. 
These are some of the structural changes transforming the 
pharmaceutical industry, so any evaluation of mergers and market 
concentration would need to consider a wide array of dynamic forces.  
Among the other significant developments on the industry’s horizon 
include the potential for regulated pricing on small molecules, including 
reference pricing in reimbursement policies and direct negotiations in 
Medicare Part D; the rising potential of biosimilars (generic biological 
drugs) and competition among biologics, which began several years ago 
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in Europe and Canada following the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency and Health Canada’s approvals and is now beginning to occur in 
the United States; emerging export markets in Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa (“BRICS”) and a changing international 
marketing landscape; and the all-important possibility of health reform, 
particularly as it might change the market and demand for biologics. 
Partially because of this rapidly changing industry, and also partially 
because of the exploratory nature of this inquiry, this review of industry 
mergers identified few strong conclusions.  Nonetheless, it identifies 
several areas for important future research: (1) whether there is an 
efficient finance market for the commercialization of drugs, and whether 
mergers create monopsony power for discoveries, or whether other 
industry players can emerge to commercialize discoveries; similarly, 
whether health care VC matures to promote promising technologies, or 
whether reimbursement and regulatory risk continue to drive VC dollars 
away from the health care sector; (2) how IT and electronic protocols will 
affect physician behavior, how they might standardize treatments and 
reduce costs, and how cost-effectiveness research affects these protocols; 
additionally, whether the introduction of IT can affect physician behavior 
at all, or if the training of physicians needs to change to capitalize on the 
potential efficiencies from IT and electronic protocols; and (3) how the 
regulatory process is changing, precisely why there are some firms able 
to achieve regulatory approval whereas others cannot, and why regulatory 
interface remains a scare competency, and how the regulatory process 
could be streamlined to reduce bottleneck effects and vulnerability to 
market concentration.  These questions should guide future inquiries into 
how merger activity and other dynamic market changes will shape 
industry performance and whether those changes translate into a clear 
direction for innovation and competition policy. 
